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Email graphs have been used to illustrate general properties of soial networks of ommuniation
and ollaboration. However, inreasingly, the majority of email tra reets opportunisti, rather
than symbioti soial relations. Here we use e-mail data drawn from a large university to onstrut
direted graphs of email exhange that quantify the dierenes between soial and antisoial behav-
iors in networks of ommuniation. We show that while strutural harateristis typial of other
soial networks are shared to a large extent by the legitimate omponent they are not harateristi
of antisoial tra. Interestingly, opportunisti patterns of behavior do reate nontrivial graphs
with ertain general harateristis that we identify. To omplement the graph analysis, whih
suers from inomplete knowledge of users external to the domain, we study temporal patterns of
ommuniation to show that the dynamial properties of email tra an, in priniple, distinguish
dierent types of soial relations.
PACS numbers: 89.75.H, 89.20.Hh, 05.65.+b
I. INTRODUCTION
The fast pae of reent progress in the quantitative
understanding of omplex networks that mediate soial
interations has been largely due to new ways of harvest-
ing data, mainly by eletroni means. For this reason
graphs of email ommuniation, where nodes represent
email users and links denote messages exhanged between
them, have beome important example soial networks.
The statistial mehanis of these networks makes possi-
ble a quantiation of aspets of human soial behavior
and their omparison to the struture of interations in
other omplex systems.
A reent study [2℄ has provided evidene for strutural
properties that are harateristi of soial graphs, but
not of other omplex networks. These are a nontrivial
lustering oeient (network transitivity) and the pres-
ene of positive degree orrelations (assortative mixing by
degree) between adjaent nodes. Moreover, it has been
suggested that soial networks an be largely understood
in terms of the organization of nodes into ommunities
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6℄, a feature that an explain, to some extent,
the observed values for the lustering oeient and de-
gree orrelations. This observation has indeed led to the
interesting suggestion that email networks an be used
to infer informal ommunities of pratie within organi-
zations [4℄, as well as their hierarhial struture [3, 4, 7℄,
features that an in priniple be useful for the eient
management of human olletive behavior. In fat, the
nature of suh hierarhies an be quantied [3, 8℄, and
may be self-similar [3℄.
Beyond these harateristis that are, at least at the
qualitative level, general to soial networks there are fea-
tures of email graphs that are spei. The most im-
portant property of email is the low ost [28℄ involved in
delivering a message to a large group of reipients. This
tends to make ommuniation between any two nodes
more indisriminate, as email senders may easily send
opies of a message to multiple parties that play no a-
tive role in the relationship between sender and reipi-
ent. As suh, we may expet that networks of email may
ontain nodes with very high degree, and that degree dis-
tributions exhibit less severe or no pratial onstraints
to their high degree tails. The result, as we show below,
is that networks of email show no upper uto in their
degree distributions, whih are sale free with a small ex-
ponent α, and degree orrelations that may be atypial
of other soial networks.
The ease with whih messages an be distributed to
many reipients is also at the root of most opportunisti
behavior involving email. In fat, there has been grow-
ing interest in unovering evidene of antisoial behavior
in online networks. Reent work addresses topis suh
as uninhibited remarks, hostile aming, non-onforming
behavior, group polarization, and spurious tra [9, 10℄.
Email as a means of potential mass distribution is par-
tiularly assoiated with the dissemination of omputer
viruses as well as spam tra [11℄, that ood the Internet
with unwanted messages usually ontaining ommerial
propositions or, more reently, a variety of other sams.
This behavior, whih we all generially antisoial, dis-
plays dierent harateristis from other types of soial
relations for whih soial networks have been onstruted
and analyzed.
In all previous haraterizations of email ommunia-
tions as networks, the problem that these networks also
mediate antisoial relations has not been addressed. In
order to attempt to eliminate suh behaviors, as well as
to deal with inomplete network reonstrution, authors
have used several strategies suh as restriting the anal-
2ysis of email tra to within the organization's domain
[3, 4, 5, 7, 12℄, taking into aount only links that dis-
play ommuniation in both diretions [3, 5, 7℄, elimi-
nating nodes assoiated with very high message volumes
[3, 5, 7℄, and setting minimal message thresholds for a
link to exist [4℄.
Here we provide a more omplete study of email net-
works by lifting most of these restritions. Then email
networks beome direted, and the number of users and
links in our dataset is dominated by spam tra. What
is oneptually interesting about spam email is that it
nevertheless displays quantitative graph theoretial and
dynamial harateristis that are nontrivial. Moreover,
these harateristis reet a ertain type of antisoial be-
havior that an be quantitatively haraterized and on-
trasted to the general properties of other soial networks.
The remaining of this manusript is organized as fol-
lows. In setion II we give details about our data and
the several networks of soial, and antisoial behavior
onstruted. We then proeed to analyze them via stan-
dard network measures for whih we expet antisoial
behavior to dier from soial. In setion III we give an
additional haraterization of the temporal struture of
time series of email and show that soial and anti-soial
tras dier in several harateristi ways. Finally we
present our onlusions.
II. NETWORK INFERENCE AND
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
To onstrut networks of email ommuniation we on-
sider the email tra from a department of a large univer-
sity. Email messages arriving at the departmental server
are lassied either as spam or legitimate by SpamAssas-
sin, a standard and widely used ltering software [13℄.
We onstrut four graphs representing dierent email
networks. A soial network is built from the legitimate
(as lassied by SpamAssassin) messages exhanged be-
tween all users, inluding those external to the depart-
ment that send/reeive e-mails to/from internal users.
Similarly, an antisoial network is built from the messages
lassied as spam, exhanged between all users. An in-
ternal soial network is built by onsidering internal users
exlusively involved in legitimate internal email ommu-
niation. Finally, the internal spam tra [29℄ is used
to build an internal antisoial network. In general these
networks are direted. We note that messages exhanged
through legitimate mailing lists, whih also involve bulk
email tra, may exhibit antisoial harateristis. As
in [14℄, aiming at minimizing the impat of suh ommu-
niation patterns in our analysis, we remove users who
exhange emails with fty or more other users from our
internal soial network.
Our four networks are built from a thirty-day log in-
luding 562664 messages, of whih 270491 are spam. The
set onsists of 19504 internal and 259069 external users.
Of these, 164998 external users are senders of spam, while
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FIG. 1: Average degree power-law distribution for soial (top)
and antisoial (bottom) networks.
that number is only 721 for those internal to the domain,
most of them under fabriated identiers. Also note that
the number of users in our log is orders of magnitude
larger that those inluded in several previously analyzed
datasets [15, 16℄.
Ebel, Mielsh and Bornholdt [15℄ analyzed a similarly
onstruted email network, although without drawing the
distintion between spam and legitimate tra. They
haraterized the degree k distributions for the entire
graph as a power law P (k) ∝ 1/kα, with exponent
α = 1.81. For the network omposed exlusively of in-
ternal users they found a smaller exponent α = 1.32.
Similarly we nd power law degree distributions for the
undireted versions of our four networks, with expo-
nents α = 1.82 (R2 = 0.942) for the full soial network,
α = 2.03 (R2 = 0.925) for the entire antisoial network,
see Figure 1, and α = 1.22 (R2 = 0.958) and α = 1.79
(R2 = 0.831) for the internal soial and antisoial net-
works, respetively. It is remarkable that our results are
broadly onsistent with those of [15℄, for entirely dierent
data. We nd a tendeny for the exponent to be larger
for antisoial behavior, whih suggests that the true so-
ial exponent may be over estimated if the two tras
are not separated. The lower values of R2 for the antiso-
ial networks suggest that the power law model is more
adequate to represent soial networks than their antiso-
ial ounterparts. Despite these dierenes, the degree
distribution is a weak disriminator between soial and
antisoial behavior and is learly aeted by inomplete
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FIG. 2: Distribution of the lustering oeient for soial,
antisoial networks and their orresponding randomized net-
works with preserved degree sequene for the internal net-
works (top) and omplete networks (bottom) built from mes-
sages exhanged between all users, internal and external.
knowledge of parts of the network, whih is a onsidera-
tion whenever external users are inluded. Suh lak of
knowledge results in the inorret shift of external users
to lower degree, and onsequently leads to larger esti-
mates of the exponent α. Thus both the failure to ex-
lude spam tra and the inomplete knowledge of links
between external users ontribute to overestimations of
the exponent α.
Next, we reall that aording to Newman and Park [2℄,
high lustering oeient and positive assortative mix-
ing are two graph theoretial quantities typial of soial
networks. Therefore, we investigate whether these two
strutural properties of email graphs an distinguish the
soial imprint of legitimate email ommuniation from
the antisoial harateristis of spam. In order to do so
we ompare the average values of these network mea-
sures determined for networks onstruted from atual
data with orresponding values obtained for networks
with randomized links, with the same degree sequene.
Indeed, onsidering the undireted versions of our net-
works, the average lustering oeient over the inter-
nal soial network is C = 0.241 ± 0.008, whereas the
lustering oeient in the internal antisoial network is
muh lower, at C = 0.052 ± 0.006. These results om-
pare to the lustering oeient of internal domain users
of C = 0.154, found by Ebel et al. [15℄. Considering the
networks that inlude external users, whose neighbors are
only known inompletely, we nd C = 0.137± 0.003 for
the soial network and C = 0.026± 0.001 for the antiso-
ial network, in ontrast with a C = 0.003 for the entire
network of Ebel et al [15℄. Figure 2 shows the distribu-
tion of the lustering oeient for soial, antisoial and
their orresponding random networks.
All four networks ontain a signiant fration of their
nodes with vanishing lustering oeient, but this pro-
portion is muh higher for graphs that inlude external
users and/or antisoial omponents. Speially, 61% of
all nodes in the entire soial network have C = 0, while
this beomes more than 81% for the entire antisoial om-
ponent. The internal soial network has only 25% of its
nodes with C = 0, ompared to 73% for the internal an-
tisoial network. These features indiate that there are
lear dierenes on average between lustering in a so-
ial and an antisoial omponents of email networks, but
also that low lustering is not a suient ondition for a
node to be assoiated with antisoial behavior. Similarly
to the analysis of the degree distribution these results
also indiate that the separation of the two tras is im-
portant in order to identify the truly soial omponent.
Failure to do so will result in the underestimation of the
average soial network transitivity.
We now analyze the nature of degree orrelations be-
tween nodes by omputing the orresponding Pearson
orrelation oeient [17℄ r
r =
∑
i jiki −M
−1
∑
i ji
∑
i′ ki′√
[
∑
i j
2
i −M
−1(
∑
i ji)
2][
∑
i k
2
i −M
−1(
∑
i ki)
2]
,(1)
where ji and ki are the exess in-degree and out-degree
of the verties that the ith edge leads into and out of,
respetively, and M is the total number of edges in the
graph.
The expetation of assortative mixing by degree in a
soial network of email is not obvious. In fat as we ar-
gued above, a user's degree is a very variable property,
that an be easily hanged drastially by the inlusion
of the user's address in, or by the use of, distribution
lists. This ommon use of email an reate huge imbal-
anes of degree between senders and reipients and may
generate negative values for the Pearson oeient even
for groups of legitimate users. If this an be expeted of
the degree orrelation in the soial network, then suh
an eet should be even more pronouned in the antiso-
ial graph. There, spam senders follow the strategy of
inreasing their degree indisriminately and maximally,
and onsequently reah on average a population of re-
ipients with muh lower degree, whih are statistially
muh more abundant for a sale free degree distribution.
These qualitative expetations are borne out by esti-
mation of r. Using (1) we omputed the Pearson oef-
ient r for eah of the four direted networks, and ob-
tained r = −0.135 for the entire soial network (with
r = −0.082 for its orresponding randomized network),
r = −0.139 (−0.111) for the entire antisoial network,
4and r = 0.232 (0.095) and r = 0.049 (0.073) for the so-
ial and antisoial internal networks, respetively. Stan-
dard errors are smaller than 1%. Moreover, we observed
that the positive value of r for the internal soial net-
work is the result of an approximately linear orrelation
between the out degree of the sender and the in degree of
the reipient. Suh systemati orrelation aross degree
is absent for the other three networks, with the dier-
ene that for networks ontaining external users there is
an average imbalane between the degrees of senders and
reipients that leads to a negative r. As we an see from
r values, the soial networks show signiantly stronger
assortativity (internal soial network) and dissassortativ-
ity (soial network) than their orresponding randomized
networks. On the other hand, there is a muh less signi-
ant dierene between the assortativity of real networks
and their orresponding randomized versions in the an-
tisoial ase.
We onjeture that the more negative Pearson oe-
ient for the omplete soial network, whih inludes ex-
ternal users, is the result of the widespread subsription
to legitimate distribution lists, suh as those related to
news, promotions, et [30℄ We veried to the extent possi-
ble, given that email user identiers are made anonymous
but domains are present, that external distribution lists
are the main soure of degree imbalane for the external
soial network.
In summary, we see that the onsideration of this set
of standard network measures plaes networks of email
ommuniation in a unique position. On the one hand,
the legitimate omponent of a ompletely known email
network shares its transitivity and positive degree orre-
lation properties with other soial networks. Unlike some
other soial networks however its degree distribution is
sale free and haraterized by a small exponent, whih
implies that, although the distribution remains normal-
izable, no nite moments exists as the network size goes
to innity (2 > α > 1). This property is a diret re-
sult of the low ost of adding additional reipients to a
message, and makes statistial estimation of degree or-
relations over email networks very sensitive and network
size dependent, if not altogether ill dened.
In spite of these properties, the antisoial network built
from the exhange of spam messages, has denite proper-
ties, showing negligible transitivity and assortative mix-
ing near their orresponding random network with pre-
served degree sequene. Moreover, our analysis shows
that, in ontrast to previous expetations [2℄, soial email
networks involving users that are external to the loal
domain may present a negative degree orrelation, pre-
sumably reeting in part the inomplete knowledge of
external links, but also resulting from message exhanges
harateristi of email, suh as the widespread subsrip-
tion to legitimate distribution lists.
These dierenes suggest mehanisms to dierentiate
legitimate human ollaboration from opportunisti be-
havior on the basis of network struture, and have in-
deed been proposed as the basis for spam detetion al-
gorithms [19, 20℄. However, muh remains unsatisfatory
about the transitivity and assortative mixing measures as
means to haraterize patterns of human ommuniation.
The most serious aw is that their estimation relies on
the knowledge of all neighbors of eah node. This is not
possible beyond a small subset, orresponding to users in
the loal domain; a general problem of the onstrution
of any network. A solution to this problem is the on-
sideration of quantities that haraterize the dynamis of
ommuniation links between senders and reipients di-
retly, without referene to third parties. In other words,
it is key to investigate whether the soial and antisoial
nature of a given node an be inferred from its dynamial
behavior, even given inomplete knowledge of the soial
network of all its neighbors.
III. TEMPORAL PATTERNS OF EMAIL
COMMUNICATION
We start with the simplest measure of ommuniation
between two users: reiproity [26℄. We build a simple
oeient of preferential exhange Ei for user i as:
Ei = 1−
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∑
j∈Ci
[k(j → i)− k(i→ j)]
∑
j∈Ci
[k(j → i) + k(i→ j)]
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(2)
where Ci is the set of all users that have ontat with
user i within a given time period, and k(j → i) is the
number of messages sent by user j to i. Therefore,
0 ≤ Ei ≤ 1, with the lower end orresponding to no
message being replied to, and the upper end to every
message obtaining a response. This an be further aver-
aged over all users to generate network expetation values
〈E〉. Considering internal as well as external users, we
nd 〈E〉 = 0.0329±0.0005 in the soial network, whereas
a signiantly lower 〈E〉 = 0.00007± 0.00002 is observed
in the antisoial network. Values of 〈E〉 = 0.2757±0.0083
and 〈E〉 = 0.0625±0.0056 are found in the internal soial
and antisoial networks, respetively. Therefore, antiso-
ial networks are naturally assoiated with small (but po-
tentially non-zero) reiproity, whereas soial networks,
partiularly those ontaining legitimate users whose be-
havior we know ompletely, are assoiated with the high-
est reiproity.
Up to this point we onentrated on the struture of
the network of interations mediated by email messages.
In its onstrution as a graph we have not paid attention
to the detailed temporal struture of message exhanges.
An interesting question then is whether the dynamial
properties of email tra an distinguish dierent types
of soial relations. This question has reently beome a
subjet of interest. Ekmann, Moses and Sergi [14℄ have
shown that oherent strutures emerge from the tempo-
ral orrelations between time series expressing short peri-
ods of intense message exhange between groups of users.
Barabasi [21℄, on the other hand, has shown that the dis-
tribution of time intervals between email messages sent
5Network Internal soial Internal
Soial Antisoial
measure soial antisoial
Degree distribution (α) 1.22 1.79 1.82 2.03
Clustering oeient (real/random) 0.2409/0.0188 0.0521/0.0103 0.1374/0.0089 0.0261/0.0124
Assortative mixing (real/random) 0.2324/0.0946 0.0493/0.0727 −0.1347/ − 0.0824 −0.1387/ − 0.1110
Preferential exhange (〈E〉) 0.27568 0.06246 0.03288 0.00007
TABLE I: Summary results for strutural measures applied to the Soial (legitimate email) and Antisoial (spam exhange)
total networks and to those restrited to internal tra within the domain.
by a single user may be well desribed by a power law dis-
tribution P (τ) ∼ τ−γ with γ ≃ 1, with bursts of ativity
alternating with long silenes.
Both these haraterizations identify properties of le-
gitimate email tra - temporal orrelations between
users and inter-message time statistis - that are thought
to be exlusively soial and thus not shared by the anti-
soial tra omponent. In fat intense email exhanges
between small groups of users are to be expeted in pat-
terns of human ommuniation, reating the orrelations
observed by Ekmann, Moses and Sergi [14℄. Barabasi in
turn suggests that the power law statistis he observed
an be explained in terms of a queueing model whih
enodes prioritization of tasks driven by human deision
making.
Although suggestive, these interesting results were ob-
tained for seleted senders and reeivers of email. Con-
sequently it remains unlear whether they hold for the
general user or for aggregated groups of users. We have
in fat attempted to verify Barabasi's ndings in our log
but obtained mixed results with some users showing the
suggested power law behavior and others manifestly not,
see Fig. 3. Similar results were reported in Ref. [25℄.
To evade eets of variability assoiated with individ-
ual users, we hose to investigated the statistis of our
soial and antisoial aggregate tras through averaging
over the behavior of all users in eah lass. The rst
obvious temporal property of email tra is its non sta-
tionarity, see Fig. 4. This feature reates diulties for
any attempt at statistial estimation. Soial email tra
in partiular shows large temporal variations, from night
to day, working days to weekends, and for our data set,
strong seasonality assoiated with the aademi alen-
dar. Antisoial tra displays weaker non-stationarity,
see Fig. 4.
The seond temporal feature of email tra is an im-
mediate result of the power law degree distributions de-
sribed above. The majority of users do not ommuniate
often with many others, but have instead low degree as-
soiated with an infrequent and often irregular usage of
email. This means that the typial email user in our data
- and, we believe, in most other large email networks -
does not show time oherene with others, nor is he/she
neessarily under the onstraints of temporal optimiza-
tion suggested by Barabasi.
To irumvent some of these diulties, we attempted
to identify statistial temporal patterns of ommunia-
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FIG. 3: The distribution of the intervals between sent mes-
sages for two of the most ative senders of legitimate email.
While gure 3 (top) shows approximate power law statistis
with power γ = 0.55 (R2 = 0.96), the distribution of g-
ure 3 (bottom), for a dierent user, is better desribed by a
log-normal distribution.
tion that are harateristi of the soial vs. antisoial
aggregated tras. In so doing we average over the be-
haviors of many users. Speially, we represent tempo-
ral patterns of message arrival through the denition of
a state in terms of a ommuniation word of size L. The
dimension L is the number of time intervals, or letters,
in the ommuniation word, whih is written as a vetor
W = [i1, i2, . . . , iL]. The simplest representation of the
tra is through a binary assignment, where the value of
ij is set to 1 if one or more messages were exhanged in
the orresponding time interval, or ij = 0 otherwise. i.e.
W = [01001 . . .01] , (3)
where there are L boolean variables, eah orresponding
6FIG. 4: Temporal power spetrum of the legitimate (top) and
spam (bottom) tras aggregated over all users in eah lass.
Daily and weekly periods are features of both tras, but
dominate legitimate email exhange. The power spetrum of
spam tra is more uniform at short times.
to the exhange, or not, of a message in onseutive time
periods ∆t. For stationary proesses the probability of
a message exhange ours with a xed probability per
unit time. The representation of time series in terms of
binary words is familiar from other ontexts in physis
and information theory [22, 23℄, from the analysis of the
time evolution of dynamial systems, to trains of ation
potential in neuronal ativity [24℄ or bit streams in noisy
ommuniation hannels. The entropy of the distribution
and its variation with the word size L give us in fat
some of the essential properties of the dynamial rules
that generate these dynamial patterns [22, 23℄.
To illustrate these statements onsider the simplest
statistial model that generates a binary time series sub-
jet to a given message arrival rate p. Then p an be
written as the probability to obtain a 1 at eah letter.
If we further assume that bits orresponding to dierent
letters are unorrelated then the bit value at eah letter
an be regarded as the result of an independent Bernoulli
trial.
Under these assumptions the probability of a given
number of events k in L trials (bins) is well known to
be given by the binomial distribution
f(k;L, p) =
(
L
k
)
pk (1− p)L−k. (4)
Moreover the probability of a sequene with the same
number of events is the same regardless of their order, as
eah ourrene is independent for dierent bins. Thus
to obtain the probability for a partiular sequene of k
events in L bins we must divide by the number of possible
arrangements
(
L
k
)
. Then the probability for a partiular
sequene or binary word with k ones and length L is
pW =
pk (1− p)L−k
∑L
k′=0
(
L
k′
)
pk′ (1 − p)L−k′
= pk (1 − p)L−k. (5)
Beause all words with a given number n of 1s are equally
likely, their probability is pW (n;L, p) = p
n (1 − p)L−n.
This implies that the Shannon entropy of the time series
an be written as
H = −
X
W
pW log2(pW ) = −〈k〉 log2
„
p
1− p
«
− L log
2
(1− p)
= m L, (6)
with 〈k〉 = Lp. Thus, in the absene of temporal orre-
lations, the Shannon entropy is a strit linearly grow-
ing funtion of the word length L, with slope m =
−(1− p) log
2
(1− p)− p log
2
p > 0.
These expressions beome espeially simple if the tem-
poral bin for eah letter is hosen suh that p = 1/2, in
whih ase m = 1 is maximal. This independent mes-
sage model (IMM) is the maximal entropy distribution
for a tra haraterized by an average message arrival
probability p. Real tras, whih show temporal stru-
ture, must therefore display lower entropy relative to the
idealized IMM message stream. We refer to the dier-
ene of the tra entropy to that of the orresponding
HIMM (L), measured with the same average hoie of p,
as the tra's strutural information, for a given L.
Figure 5 shows the dierene between the entropy of
the independent message model and the real tras, le-
gitimate and spam. We aggregated the data into two
temporal periods: work hours (i. e. the period from
8AM to 8PM of the weekdays, exept holidays, in the
log) and remaining times whih we refer to as non-work
hours.
The results show that the soial email tra has lower
entropy (higher strutural information) than the antiso-
ial tra for both work and non-work periods. This
dierene beomes more notieable the larger the word,
thus apturing longer patterns of ommuniation and the
presene of time orrelations. The dierene between the
independent message model, where for p = 1/2 all words
are equally likely, and the real tras is that in the latter
words with many 1s (0s) are suppressed while the prob-
ability of words with two to three 1s separated by one
to three 0s is enhaned. The dierene between soial
and antisoial tras is more subtle, with soial email
tra displaying a greater probability for words with an
isolated message in a long stream of silene. These stru-
tures are reminisent of those found by Barabasi [21℄, but
display less denitive statistial signatures. Nevertheless,
we see that both soial and antisoial tras are far from
random, and that soial email shows stronger temporal
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FIG. 5: The variation of the dierene between the indepen-
dent message model entropyHIMM (L) and the entropy of the
legitimate and spam tras H(L), with word size L, during
work (top) and non-work (bottom) periods. All word proba-
bility distributions were onstruted by normalizing the time
bin for eah letter word so that p = 1/2. As a result the
time bin for eah letter of the soial tra during work hours
was set to 4s, and 11s for the orresponding non-work period.
Time bins for the antisoial tra were set at 4s during work
hours and 5s otherwise. The slight exess urvature for large
L is the result of poorer estimation of rare long words.
struture with a high probability for long silenes and
bursts of a few messages.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the rihness of behaviors in human
ommuniation - both symbioti and opportunisti or an-
tisoial - is present in the struture of networks of email
ommuniation and an be quantied via graph theo-
retial and time series analysis. Opportunisti nodes dis-
play antisoial behavior that an be aptured graphially
through the absene of denite metris present in other
soial networks. Perhaps even more diretly, antisoial
email tra an be identied by a greater statistial sim-
pliity (higher entropy) in temporal patterns of ommu-
niation, typial of the fat that eah sender/reipient
relationship is not developed to be unique and the same
shemes are used to reah many reipients indisrimi-
nately. Moreover, the ease to exhange email messages
that leads to these opportunisti behaviors also has on-
sequenes for the truly soial omponent of the network,
whih exhibits a power law degree distribution with a
small exponent and, in some ases, small or negative as-
sortative mixing by degree. We believe that the quantita-
tive harateristis of antisoial ommuniation patterns
observed here for email networks are probably general to
other opportunisti soial behaviors, bound to be present
in other networks of human interation.
Aknowledgments
The authors thank CNPq (Brazilian Counil for Re-
searh and Development), Los Alamos National Labora-
tory and the Central Bank of Brazil for support.
[1℄ M. Newman and D. Watts and S. Strogatz Pro. Natl.
Aad. Si. USA 99, 2566-2572 (2002).
[2℄ M. E. J. Newman, and J. Park, Phys. Rev. E 68, 036122
(2003).
[3℄ R. Guimerà, L. Danon, A. Díaz-Guilera, F. Giralt, and
A. Arenas, Phys. Rev. E 68, 065103(R) (2003).
[4℄ J.R. Tyler, D. M. Wilkinson, B. A. Huberman, Pro.
of the 1st International Conferene on Communities and
Tehnologies,Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September
19-21, 2003.
[5℄ A. Arenas, L. Danon, A. Díaz-Guilera, P. M. Gleiser, and
R. Guimera, Eur. Phys. J. B 38, 373 (2004).
[6℄ J. M. Casado, T. Garnkel, W. Cui, V. Paxson, and S.
Savage Pro. of the 4th Workshop on Hot Topis in Net-
works, Maryland, MD, November 14-15, 2005.
[7℄ R. Guimerà, L. Danon, A. Díaz-Guilera, F. Giralt, and
A. Arenas, J. Eonomi Behaviour & Organization (in
press) .
[8℄ A. Trusina, S. Maslov, P. Minnhagen, and K. Sneppen,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 178702 (2004).
[9℄ B. Wellman, J. Sala, D. Dimitrova, L. Garton, M. Gulia,
and C. Haythornthwaite Annual Review of Soiology 22,
213 (1996).
[10℄ J. G. Kossinets, and D. J. Watts Siene, 311, 5757
(2006).
[11℄ Aording to the Spamhaus Projet (Spamhaus.org) as
of Otober 2004 spam messages aount for about 74%
of all email tra.
[12℄ M. E. J. Newman, S. Forrest, and J. Balthrop, Phys. Rev.
E 66, 035101(R) (2002).
[13℄ See the SpamAssassin Home Page:
http://www.spamassassin.org
[14℄ J P. Ekmann, E. Moses, and D. Sergi, Pro. Natl. Aad.
Si. USA 101, 14333 (2004).
[15℄ H. Ebel, L. I. Mielsh, and S. Bornholdt, Phys. Rev. E
66, 035103(R) (2002).
8[16℄ J. Shetty, and J. Adibi Pro. of The Eleventh ACM
SIGKDD International Conferene on Knowledge Dis-
overy and Data Mining, Chiago, IL, August 21-24,
2005.
[17℄ M. E. J. Newman, Phys. Rev. Letters 89(20), 208701
(2002).
[18℄ M. E. J. Newman, Phys. Rev. E 67, 026126 (2002).
[19℄ L. Gomes, F. Castro, L. Bettenourt, V. Almeida, J.
Almeida, R. Almeida Steps to Reduing Unwanted Traf-
 on the Internet (SRUTI 2005), Sponsored by USENIX,
Cambridge, MA, July 7-8, 2005
[20℄ P. O. Boykin and V. Royhowdhury IEEE Computer 38-
4, 61 (2005).
[21℄ A. L. Barabási, Nature 435, 207 (2005).
[22℄ W. Bialek, I. Nemenman, and N. Tishby, Neural Com-
putation 13, 2409-2463 (2001).
[23℄ J. P. Crutheld, and D. P. Feldman, Santa Fe Institute
tehnial report 01-02-012 (2001)
[24℄ F. Rieke, D. Warland, R. R. de Ruyter Van Stevenink,
W. Bialek, Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code, (MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997).
[25℄ D. B. Stouer, R. D. Malmgren, and L. A. N. Amaral,
Nature 435, 207 (2005).
[26℄ D. Garlashelli and M. I. Loredo, Phys. Rev. Letters
93, 268701 (2004).
[27℄ A. Vazquez, R. Pastor-Satorras, and A. Vespignani,
Phys. Rev. E 65, 066130 (2002).
[28℄ In energy, time and reputation of the sender
[29℄ Originating from and addressed to an internal user. These
are usually the result of forged identiers.
[30℄ Reall that, unlike the internal soial network, node de-
grees in our entire soial network are not onstrained,
and thus, may represent distribution lists.
